Survey of Recent Developments
in Products Liability Law
Traditionally in this section, the Seton Hall Law Review
presents synopses of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners.
In connection with this symposium issue, we present digests of recent
products liability cases which have emanatedfrom variousjurisdictions.
In so doing, we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of
some of the significant developments in this field of law.
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EcoRiver
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 106 S.Ct. 2295 (1986).

ADMIRALTY-COMMERCIAL

PARTY MAY NOT RECOVER
NOMIC LOSSES UNDER PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM-East

In 1969, Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation (Seatrain) contracted with defendant Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (Delaval) "to
design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of turbines"
needed for four oil-transporting supertankers then under construction by Seatrain. 106 S.Ct. at 2296. Once completed, the
tankers were conveyed to subsidiaries of Seatrain under a charter
agreement which granted the charterers full ownership rights for
a period of twenty or twenty-two years. The subsidiaries were
responsible for costs of maintenance and repairs to the ships. Id.
In December, 1977, one of the ships, while on its maiden voyage,
experienced problems with the high-pressure turbine manufactured by Delaval. In 1978, two of the other vessels suffered comparable damage to their turbines. Id. at 2296-97. On its maiden
voyage in 1980, the fourth ship's low-pressure turbine was damaged due to an installation error. Id. at 2297.
The charterers, claiming admiralty jurisdiction, filed suit
against Delaval in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey. Id. The complaint alleged five counts of tortious
conduct and sought damages for the cost of repairing the tankers
as well as for income lost while the ships were under repair. The
first four counts alleged that the defendant was strictly liable for
design defects in each of the four tankers' high-pressure turbines. The fifth count alleged that the defendant negligently supervised the installation of the fourth ship's low-pressure
turbine. Since a statute of limitations defense barred any contract action, the charterers were limited to their tort claim. Id.
Holding that the action was not cognizable in tort, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. In
affirming, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that
only when a defective product creates an unreasonable likelihood
of harm to persons or to property besides the product itself, and
this harm in fact materializes, will damage occurring to a defective product be actionable in tort. Id. The court of appeals held
that customer dissatisfaction with the product's quality was best
handled by warranty law. Id.
The United States Supreme Court, in resolving a conflict
among the circuits, unanimously affirmed the decision of the
lower courts. Id. at 2298, 2305. The Court first held that since
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the alleged tort was committed either on navigable waters or on
the high seas, admiralty jurisdiction was satisfied. Id. at 2298.
The Court then determined that the body of maritime tort principles should incorporate products liability concepts. Id. at 2299.
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that products liability actions are
grounded on negligence and strict liability principles already incorporated into general maritime law. With those principles in
mind, the Court proceeded to "determine whether a commercial
product injuring [only] itself is the kind of harm against which
public policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of
any contractual obligation." Id. at 2300. The Supreme Court, in
adopting the majority land-based approach, held that when the
only injury is the failure of a product to function properly, a
plaintiff may only pursue a contract claim. Id. at 2302. The
Court reasoned that when a product malfunctions without causing injury to either persons or property, the purchaser suffers a
purely economic loss which is not actionable in tort. Thus, when
the harm to the product results in repair costs, lost profits, and
decreased value, the purchaser has lost the benefit of his bargain,
a "core concern of contract law." Id.
The Court averred that contract and warranty law controlled
instances involving damage solely to a defective product because
such actions constituted claims of "insufficient product value."
Id. at 2303. Commercial disputes, the Court reasoned, are best
resolved by contract law because the parties are free to contractually allocate their risks and liabilities in the terms of their
purchase agreement. Therefore, in exchange for a reduction of
the purchase price, the manufacturer may limit its liability
through warranty disclaimers. The Court concluded that, absent
a large disparity of bargaining power, it need not interfere with
the parties' contractual allocation of risk.
Lastly, the Court noted that damages in contract and warranty actions are limited by privity and the "foreseeable result of
the breach." Id. at 2303-04. Products liability law, in contrast,
has no such limitation on damages. Thus, the Court concluded,
under products liability law, manufacturers would be liable for
unlimited damages as the charterers, subcharterers, and the charterer's customers would all be able to assert economic losses
caused by the defective turbines. Id. at 2304.
In East River, the Supreme Court established a parity between admiralty law and land-based law that a commercial party
may not recover purely economic losses through products liabil-
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ity theory. In so holding, the Court helped delineate the provinces of tort and contract law in the products liability field.
Further, the Court's ruling recognized and reaffirmed the right of
parties to contractually establish the degree of liability for expectation losses. The contractual allocation of economic liability allows manufacturers to competitively market their products.
Notions of freedom of contract are obscured, however, in situations involving great disparity of bargaining power between the
contractual parties. Unfortunately, no clear standard for determining the existence of such gross disparity has been established.
Paul E. Paray

DEFENSES-IN

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM, FAILURE TO

READ PRINTED WARNING GIVES RISE TO DEFENSE OF PRODUCT

MIsUsE-Uptainv. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo.

1986).
Tonya Uptain's hands were seriously burned after using
Sani-Tate, a cleaning compound containing a twenty-three percent hydraulic acid solution manufactured by Huntington Lab,
Inc. (Huntington). The Sani-Tate labels warned against skin
contact with the product due to potential chemical burns and to
wash skin thoroughly with water should contact occur. 723 P.2d
at 1323-24. Uptain, an employee in the housekeeping department of Southwest Memorial Hospital, was instructed to apply
Sani-Tate with a swab which required periodic rinsing. Although
there was a conflict whether she was instructed to wear rubber
gloves, Uptain used her bare hands to wring the swab after each
rinsing. Uptain's hand soon became red and blistered, necessitating immediate medical attention. Due to the severity of the
burns, Uptain required numerous skin graft operations. Her
hand became permanently scarred. Id. at 1324.
Uptain instituted a products liability claim against Huntington on the grounds that inadequate warnings on the bottle of
Sani-Tante rendered the product defective. Huntington raised
the defense of misuse, asserting that the warnings were adequate
and that Uptain assumed the risk of injury by failing to read and
adhere to the instructions. Id. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Huntington and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. The
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Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari to determine several issues, including whether the court of appeal's definition of
misuse was correct and whether evidence of Huntington's newly
designed label was properly excluded at the trial level. Id. The
Supreme Court affirmed on both counts. Id. at 1325.
Justice Kirshbaum, writing for the majority, first noted that
contributory negligence is not a viable defense in strict liability
claims. The justice observed, however, that the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A comment h, provides an exception to this
rule "when unforeseeable abnormal handling of an otherwise
safe product causes injuries." Id. at 1324. Accordingly, the court
held that misuse is a "particularized defense" which requires that
the plaintiff's injuries arise from the unintended and unforeseeable use of a product. Id. at 1325. Justice Kirshbaum explained
that the concept of misuse encompasses the "use of a product in
a manner other than that which was intended as well as use for an
unintended purpose." Id. at 1326. The court ruled that the failure to read and heed the warnings printed on the product may
constitute an unforeseeable use of Sani-Tate. In support of its
position, the court cited Restatement § 402A, comment j, which
established the assumption that printed warnings would be "read
and heeded." Id. The court held that whether Uptain's barehanded application of Sani-Tate coupled with her failure to read
the warning was unforeseeable was a question of fact and thus
properly left to the jury. Id.
The court dismissed Uptain's assertion that the trial court
erred in denying admission of a new warning label drafted by the
defendant prior to the date of the accident. Id. at 1329. The proposed new Sani-Tate label included all of the prior warnings plus
an instruction to wear rubber gloves. Id. at 1326-27. Uptain argued that evidence as to the new label should be permitted under
Colorado Rules of Evidence 407 (identical to FRE 407) in order
to prove the feasibility of the precautionary measures. Id. at
1327. The court ruled that Rule 407 addressed only post-event
corrective measures; therefore, it would not apply to the present
case because the defendant submitted the proposed label one
year before Uptain was injured. Id. at 1328. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that the prejudicial effect of the new label precluded its admission into evidence. Id. at 1329.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Quinn asserted that
the defense of misuse is appropriate only upon a showing that
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adequate warnings were given. Id. at 1332 (Quinn, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Quinn felt that Uptain's failure to read the
label would be immaterial if the warnings were inadequate or
would not have prevented her injuries. The dissent criticized the
majority for strongly intimating that failure to read a warning automatically gives rise to the defense of misuse regardless of the
warning's adequacy. Id. Under this approach, Chief Justice
Quinn believed that, in the instant case, the jury was permitted to
render a verdict for the manufacturer even though it may have
already found the product defective. Id. at 1334 (Quinn, C.J.,
dissenting). Consequently, the justice determined that this instructional flaw warranted a new trial. Id.
While the defense of misuse is needed to guard against the
unintended and unforeseeable abuse of a manufacturer's product, a logical presumption is that abuse results when adequate
warnings are not heeded. If, as the majority suggests, conduct is
relevant in duty to warn cases, primary focus should be centered
on the manufacturer's conduct in communicating with the consumer. A plaintiff's conduct must remain a secondary concern if
the rational imposition of products liability law is to be served.
Judicial failure to review a manufacturer's communications may
allow defective products to remain on the market until a more
"literate" plaintiff suffers injury due to inadequate warnings.
The approach used by the Uptain majority is unfortunate, as
proof of adequacy would have substantiated the defense of misuse without exposing the public to undetected dangers.
Stephan W. Milo

STRICT LIABILITY-PAVING CONTRACTOR MAY NOT BE CHARACTERIZED As MANUFACTURER AND Is NOT LIABLE FOR PATENT DEFECTS KNOWN To OWNER-Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.
v. Vaughn, 491 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1986).
In January 1981, Mary Vaughn and her husband were involved in an automobile accident on County Road 1087 in Walton County, Florida. 491 So.2d at 552-53. While attempting to
change lanes, Mrs. Vaughn lost control of her car as a result of a
two-inch drop off in the road's pavement. Id. at 552. In the ensuing accident, Mrs. Vaughn was killed and her husband was seri-
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ously injured. Id. at 553. Edward E. Chadbourne, Inc.
(Chadbourne), a contractor had manufactured the paving materials and repaved County Road 1087 in October and November of
1978. Id. at 552.
In April 1979, the Florida Department of Transportation
(DOT) tested and approved the paving materials. Id. Walton
County subsequently became responsible for the maintenance of
the road. Id. Approximately three weeks prior to the accident, a
Walton County commissioner, acting in his official capacity, inspected the portion of Road 1087 where the Vaughns' accident
occurred. Id. This investigation revealed that erosion of the
pavement had created height differentials on the road's surface.
Id.
Mr. Vaughn instituted an action against Chadbourne for personal injuries and the wrongful death of his wife. Id. at 553. The
complaint alleged that Chadbourne, as manufacturer and contractor of the road, was liable under the theories of negligence,
strict liability, and warranty. Id. The trial court, without articulating a basis for its decision, granted summary judgment in favor
of Chadbourne. Id. On appeal, the appellate court determined
there were material issues of fact in dispute and thus reversed the
decision of the lower court. See id. In reversing the lower court's
decision, the district court of appeal determined that Chadbourne was a manufacturer. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of
the trial court's order of summary judgment for the defendant.
Id. at 554. The court held that an action in strict liability as applied to Chadbourne was inappropriate because the public road
did not constitute a product. Id. at 553. ChiefJustice McDonald,
writing for the majority, noted that public roads, unlike other
products placed into the stream of commerce, are not available
for purchase in the open market. Id. Additionally, the supreme
court found that Mr. Vaughn "failed to make a prima facie showing that Chadbourne's acts proximately caused the injury." Id.
The court noted that the DOT was a sophisticated, knowledgeable purchaser which tested the paving materials and the completed road at both the time of purchase and three weeks prior to
the accident. Id. at 554. Relying on prior decisions, the court
determined that the county's knowledge of the dangerous condition coupled with its responsibility for repair and maintenance of
the road negated any claim that Chadbourne's activities were the
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proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the Vaughns. Id.
According to the majority, public policy would be violated if a
person, categorized as a manufacturer or a contractor, was held
strictly liable for patent defects known to the owner. Id.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Adkins strongly criticized the
majority's decision. See id. at 554 (Adkins, J., dissenting). The
justice disagreed with the court's refusal to acknowledge paving
material, manufactured and applied by a contractor, as a product.
See id. Such refusal, according to the dissent, was not only inconsistent with prior decisions but would also cause difficulty in insuring that manufacturers bear their share of the liability for
harm caused by their defective products. Id. at 554-56 (Adkins,
J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Adkins found the majority's
conclusion regarding the plaintiff's proof of proximate causation
to be equally without merit. Id. at 556 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
Justice Adkins explained that since the issues of causation,
liability, and comparative negligence were never adjudicated, Mr.
Vaughn had been denied "his constitutionally guaranteed right
of access to the courts." Id. at 554, 557-58 (Adkins, J., dissent.ing). Furthermore, Justice Adkins emphasized that proximate
cause is a question of fact to be determined by a jury and not by
the court. Id. at 556 (Adkins, J., dissenting). In the dissent's
view, the majority opinion failed to recognize that, absent a jury
determination, neither Chadbourne's cognizance of the subsequent DOT inspection of the road nor the alleged obvious nature
of the defects were sufficient to absolve Chadbourne of liability.
Id. at 557-58 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
In Chadbourne, the court, without determining issues of causation or comparative negligence, held that an individual may escape liability for patent defects simply by a judicial determination
that he or she is not a manufacturer. The dissent correctly observed that a constitutional deprivation of access to the courts
occurred as a result. The majority's focus upon the sophistication of the purchaser as a means of summarily disposing of questions of fact is clearly unjustified. When an innocent third party
is injured as a result of an admitted defect in an item of manufacture, a denial ofjudicial relief frustrates the intended purpose of
an action in strict liability. Thus, the ultimate effect of the Chadbourne decision is likely to stagnate the field of products liability
law in jurisdictions that choose to follow its rationale.
Marianne Benevenia
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DAMAGES-COMPARATIVE

FAULT PRINCIPLES ARE INAPPLICABLE

IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES-Lippard v.

Houdaille In-

dustries, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986).
As part of his employment, Thomas Lippard was responsible
for operating a planing machine. 715 S.W.2d at 492. The
machine had been manufactured by Houdaille Industries
(Houdaille) and was equipped with a metal guard designed to
prevent the operator from coming into contact with the blades.
While Lippard was operating the machine, a board slipped from
his hand. As he reached for the board, Lippard was severely injured because the protective guard failed to operate properly. Id.
Lippard filed suit against Houdaille alleging that the
machine was defective and unreasonably dangerous. He further
alleged that the defendant had not adequately warned of the possible danger. Id. The defendant sought and received a comparative negligence jury instruction on the ground that Lippard
operated the planing machine negligently. Id. The jury subsequently determined that the plaintiff had incurred $75,000 in
damages. Id. Thejury also determined, however, that each party
had been equally at fault. Id. As a result, the court entered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $37,500.
The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The pivotal issue on appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri
was whether comparative fault analysis was applicable in products liability cases. At the outset, the Missouri Supreme Court
recognized that other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue in
various ways. Id. at 493 n.2. A number of courts, for example,
had held the principle of comparative fault to be wholly inapplicable to strict liability cases. Id. (citations omitted). Conversely,
other courts had totally integrated comparative fault into the law
of strict liability. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, several
courts had decided to steer an intermediate course between these
two extremes. Id. (citations omitted).
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmar relied solely on
the Missouri common law rule that a "plaintiff's contributory
negligence is not at issue in products liability case." Id. at 493.
Accordingly, the court averred that manufacturers should be liable for injuries caused by their defective products irrespective of
the degree of the plaintiff's own carelessness. Id. at 494. Thus,
the court determined that the defendant may not seek an instruction regarding comparative fault. Id. at 493. The majority, how-
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ever, noted that a products liability defendant may use the
plaintiff's alleged carelessness to demonstrate that the product
either was not unreasonably dangerous or that it was not the
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Id.
According to the Lippard court, even a negligent plaintiff may
recover damages if the trier of fact determines that his injuries
were caused by a defective product. Id. The court noted, however, that an instruction relating to the degree of the plaintiff's
carelessness would not be precluded if the plaintiff voluntarily
and unreasonably exposed himself to a known danger. See id. at
493-94.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rendlen noted that a prior
case had introduced comparative fault principles into the negligence law of Missouri. Id. at 495 (Rendlen,J., concurring) (citing
Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983)). Justice Rendlen
noted, however, that that case "did not and could not have determined the applicability of comparative fault to strict products liability cases." Id. The justice further determined that the
doctrine of comparative fault was "similarly inapplicable to strict
liability." Id. Justice Robertson, who also concurred in the result
reached by the majority, nevertheless asserted that the "applicability of comparative fault to products liability actions. . ." had
not been clearly addressed by prior decisions. Id. at 497 (Robertson, J., concurring). He stressed that the issue should be addressed by the state's legislature and not by the courts. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Donnelly advocated the application of a "system of pure comparative fault" to both negligence and products liability actions. Id. at 499 (Donnelly, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Welliver viewed
comparative liability as a crucial aspect of products liability litigation. Id. at 501 (Welliver, J., dissenting). Justice Welliver's position was premised on notions of fairness and prior Missouri
decisions. Id. at 502 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (citing Gustafson v.
Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983)). Therefore, the justice viewed
the majority's ruling as a covert reversal of Missouri common
law. Id. at 503 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
The issue of whether principles of comparative fault should
be applicable to products liability actions has caused sharp division among courts and judges alike. The Lippard case demonstrates that logical and well reasoned arguments can be advanced
by those on either side of the issue. Although a majority of
states, including New Jersey, have held comparative fault or neg-
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ligence applicable to strict products liability litigation, see id. at
502 n.5 (Welliver, J., dissenting), the issue is far from settled.
The Lippard court adopting the minority position proves it to be a
viable alternative.
Christopher L. Musmanno

STATUTE OF REPOSE-LEGISLATIVE

LIMITATION ON ALLOWABLE TIME FOR FILING PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM VIOLATES

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION-Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.
1986).
In 1963, Ingram Manufacturing Company produced a multiton earth packer that, after a series of owners, was ultimately
purchased in 1980 by Williams County, North Dakota. 389
N.W.2d at 320. Subsequently, the earth packer was borrowed by
the city of Williston. City employee Todd Hefta, the appellant
Hanson's twenty-two year old son, was assigned to operate the
machine along with another city worker. Id. On August 24,
1983, as Hefta walked behind the earth packer, his fellow worker
attempted to start it, allegedly checking the clutch to make sure
the gears were in neutral. When he pushed the starter button,
the machine " 'jumped backwards' " killing Hefta. Id. The following year, Hanson filed a wrongful death action charging "negligence, breach of implied warranty and strict liability in tort."

Id.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute of repose provision of
the North Dakota Products Liability Act barred the action. Id.
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20-01.1-02(1) (1977)). The act provided that no products liability action could be brought unless
the injury or death occurred within ten years of the original
purchase or within eleven years of manufacture of the defective
product. Id. A statute of repose differs from a statute of limitation in that the latter bars an action unless it is filed within a specified period after injury occurs while the former terminates any
right of action after a specific period of time regardless of
whether an injury has occurred. Id. at 321.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
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grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. Id.
at 328. The court held that the act violated the state constitution's equal protection clause. Id. That clause states in pertinent
part that no citizen shall "be granted privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens."
Id. at 323 n.8 (citing N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21). Writing for the
majority, Justice Gierke limited the court's consideration to the
equal protection issue while noting that Hanson also raised other
challenges to the act based on both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 322-23.
The court first faced a decision on which of three levels of

review to apply in assessing the act's constitutionality. Declaring
"that the right to recover for personal injuries is not a fundamental right," the court rejected the appellant's request for application of strict scrutiny, the highest level of review. Id. at 323 n.9.
The court also declined to apply the lowest level of review which
sustains a legislative classification unless shown to be blatantly
arbitrary and without a "rational relationship" to a legitimate
government purpose. Id. at 323. Justice Gierke, instead, viewed
the right to recover for personal injury as an important "substantive right" deserving an intermediate standard of review. Id. at
325. This standard demands a "'close correspondence between
statutory classification and legislative goals.' " Id. at 323 (quoting
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978)).
Justice Gierke noted that the North Dakota statute of repose
divided plaintiffs in products liability claims into two classesthose who had been injured within eleven years of manufacture
and those who had not and were therefore barred from recovery.
Id. at 326-27. The question before the court was whether there
was "such a close correspondence between this statutory classification and the legislative goals" to justify the class distinction.
Id. at 327 (citations omitted). Observing that the state legislature
was responding to a perceived crisis of unaffordable products liability insurance, the court found that the act's purpose was to

create a climate of stability within the insurance arena that would
stimulate reasonable rates and expedite claim settlements. Id. at
327-28. Although the court did not question the legislature's
finding of facts as to the crisis, it nevertheless required more justification for the arbitrary classification. Id. at 328. Justice Gierke
pointed out that when human life and safety are at stake, a rational basis must exist other than merely the economic interests
of manufacturers or suppliers. Id.
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In her concurring opinion, Justice Levine emphasized the
legislative history of the act. See id. at 329 (Levine, J., concurring). The interim legislative committee working on the act received testimony that the bill "would not alleviate... increasing
premiums because of the lack of information and the resultant
uncertainty about insurance industry rate-making methods." Id.
(Levine, J., concurring). The justice found that a close correspondence between the legislative goal of controlling rising
products liability rates and the statutory classification could not
be found in a statute "grounded on guesswork, frustration and
little more than a wing and a prayer." Id. (Levine, J.,
concurring).
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Erickstad argued that the statute
did not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution. Id. at 330 (Erickstad,J., dissenting). While Justice Erickstad
agreed with the majority that the intermediate level of review was
appropriate, id. at 337 (Erickstad,J., dissenting), he found a close
relationship between the legislative goals and the classifications.
Id. at 343 (Erickstad, J., dissenting). While the debate in the
North Dakota Legislature concerned whether one state's enactment of a statute of repose would have any effect on insurance
rates (which are set based on a national standard), Justice Erickstad pointed to the information also received by the legislature
that "[a]t least twenty-one states have had statutes of repose intended specifically for products liability cases." Id. at 341 (Erickstad, J., dissenting). Justice Erickstad noted that similar and
collective efforts by other states could impact the legislative goal
of stabilizing or reducing insurance rates in North Dakota. Thus,
the justice found a close correspondence between the ends and
the means of the act. Id. at 343 (Erickstad, J., dissenting).
Public policy demands that death or injury due to a faulty
product be compensated. By putting manufacturers on notice
that they will be held liable for product defects arising many
years after the initial manufacture, they are encouraged to strictly
supervise the production of their products with public safety as
an underlying concern. There is, however, also a competing
public policy calling for certainty in the marketplace. This certainty is upended by soaring insurance rates and ageless claims.
Neither a statute of repose nor, alternatively, legislative silence
satisfies the public's needs.
As of this date, there is no consensus in either state or federal courts as to the constitutionality of such statutes. Recent

796

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:782

cases directly contradict the instant opinion. In Jones v. Five Star
Engineering, 717 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1986), for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld that state's statute of repose and
barred the wrongful death action by the family of a man fatally
injured while using a power-driven posthole digger. The court
found the statute to be a legitimate exercise of legislative authority and not in conflict with either federal or state constitutional
due process or equal protection provisions. Id. at 882-83.
A more enlightened approach to this area is the middle
ground suggested favorably in dicta by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hanson, as set forth in the Commerce Department's proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act. Hanson,
389 N.W.2d at 328, 342 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1979)). The
Model Act creates a presumption, which is rebuttable by clear
and convincing evidence, that harm caused more than ten years
after delivery of the product arose after the expiration of the useful safe life of the product. Id. This presumption, rather than a
harsh, arbitrary cut-off date, would provide for the competing
public interests while giving all sides a level playing field.
Donna M. duBeth

DUTY TO

WARN-MACHINE DESIGNER HAS

DuTy To

WARN END

USERS OF POSSIBLE DANGER INHERENT IN ITS PRODUCTS-

Alm v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W. 2d 588 (Tex.
1986).
On June 3, 1976,James Alm's eye was severely injured when
he was struck by an aluminum bottle cap which had exploded off
a soft-drink bottle. 717 S.W.2d at 590. The resealable aluminum
cap was produced by a capping machine which had been
designed and patented by Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa). Id. at 589. JFW Enterprises Inc., (JFW) bottled the softdrink using a capping machine purchased from Alcoa. Alm sued
Alcoa, JFW, and the supermarket which sold him the soft-drink
under the theories of negligence and strict liability. Id. at 590.
Alcoa, however, was the only defendant that did not settle with
Alm.
At trial, Alm contended, inter alia, that Alcoa possessed a
duty to warn consumers "of the hazard of bottle cap blow off."
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Id. The jury found Alcoa liable but determined that strict products liability was inapplicable. Id. The jury, however, awarded
Alm one million dollars in punitive damages. The trial judge rejected the jury's findings with respect to negligence and strict liability, and held Alcoa liable under the principles of simple
negligence. See id. at 590. The trial court awarded Aim $300,500
in compensatory damages. Id.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and
held the evidence did not support a finding that Alcoa was negligent in warning of the hazards inherent in its capping method.
Id. In so holding, the court stated that while Alcoa did not possess a duty to directly warn consumers, it was obligated to provide warnings to the bottlers. The appellate court ruled that
Alcoa had satisfied this duty. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas noted that, in some
instances, a manufacturer's duty to warn may be satisfied by providing notice to an intermediary. Id. at 591. Writing for the majority, Justice Kilgarlin offered the example of a drug
manufacturer satisfying its duty to warn ultimate consumers by
providing adequate information to doctors. In such a situation,
the doctor acts as a "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and the public. Id. Thus, the drug manufacturer is liable
under failure to warn principles only if it gives the doctor inadequate or misleading information concerning the use of the drug.
Id. at 592.
Additionally, the court noted that bulk manufacturers of raw
materials may similarly satisfy the duty to warn consumers of defects via an intermediate distributor. Id. In its ruling, the court
likened Alcoa's position to a bulk supplier. Specifically, the court
noted that "Alcoa [had] no package of its own on which to place a
warning and no control, except by contractual requirements,
over the final package labeling which reaches consumers." Id.
The court then held that Alcoa's duty to warn consumers
would be satisfied if the intermediate manufacturer or distributor
was given adequate warning of the dangers inherent in the product. Id. at 593. According to the Alm court, factors used in determining whether the warnings are adequate include the level of
the distributor's training, its knowledge about the product, and
its ability to warn consumers. Id. at 592-94. The court, however,
did not decide the question whether the warnings from Alcoa
were adequate under these guidelines; instead, it remanded the
case to the appellate level for reconsideration. Id. at 595.
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In dissent, Justice Gonzalez viewed the duty of care owed by
Alcoa slightly more narrowly than the majority. Id. at 595 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Instead of requiring either a warning to the
consumer, or an effective warning to the intermediary, the dissent stated that the duty to the consumer would be met if there
was an adequate warning to the bottler who stood between Alcoa
and the consumer. Id. at 596-97 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). More
troubling to the dissent was the majority's position regarding Alcoa's burden of proving that its warnings were accurate. See id. at
599 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). The majority stated that Alcoa
should carry the burden of proving that the bottler "was adequately trained and warned, familiar with the propensities of the
product, and capable of passing on the warning." Id. at 592.
The dissent contended that a plaintiff who brings a cause of action traditionally has the burden of proving that the warnings
were inadequate. Id. at 599 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the majority's view constituted "an unprecedented reversal of the burden of proof." Id.
The Alm majority held that Alcoa, as designer and manufacturer of a machine used in the bottling of carbonated beverages,
had a duty to warn the ultimate consumer. This duty could be
satisfied either by a direct warning to the consumer or by a warning to the intermediary manufacturer. Labelling this a duty to
warn misinterprets the real duty of care owed to the consumer. A
warning that would satisfy the first alternative proposed by the
majority would tell a consumer that an improperly sealed bottle
cap could explode and cause personal injury. This warning
would be of little value to a consumer who would never be in a
position to know whether or not a bottle cap was properly sealed.
The better view is that the duty of care owed by the designer
or manufacturer in a case such as this is to insure that a safe
product is put into the hands of consumers in the first instance.
Alcoa should have had a duty to warn the intermediary. In addition, a designer or manufacturer who licenses the use of his ideas
or equipment to an intermediary should be required to insure
that all needed safety precautions be taken by the intermediary.
This added burden would not unduly interfere with or halt the
flow of commerce. It may, however, reduce the incidence of personal injuries suffered by the public.
George G. Campion
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ADEQUACY OF

WARNING-MANUFACTURER
Is NOT LIABLE
FOR INJURIES CAUSED By PRODUCT'S USE WHERE THERE ARE

No DEFECTS AND WARNINGS ARE ADEQUATE-Baughn v.
Honda Motor Company, 107 Wash.2d 127, 727 P.2d 655
(1986).
On August 14, 1972, two young boys, Douglas Bratz and
Bradley Baughn, were injured when the Honda mini-trail bike
they had been riding collided with a truck. 106 Wash.2d at 130,
727 P.2d at 658. The parents of each boy were familiar with the
use of motorcycles and had purchased mini-bikes for their children on prior occasions. Id. at 131, 727 P.2d at 658. Prior to the
accident, the boys' parents repeatedly warned them not to ride
the mini-bikes on the public streets. Id. In addition, a label located on the mini-bike, as well as instructions contained in the
owner's manual, clearly stated that the bike was designed strictly
for off-the-road use. Id. at 129-30, 727 P.2d at 658.
In September 1976, Jack Baughn instituted an action on his
son's behalf, against Bratz's parents, in Pierce County Superior
Court. Id. at 131, 727 P.2d at 658. The suit was dismissed in
February 1978. In November 1982, Baughn amended his complaint and filed an action in federal district court against the
Honda Motor Company and two other Honda affiliates (collectively referred to as Honda). Id. In August 1983, each claim was
dismissed without prejudice and the case was refiled in Pierce
County Superior Court. Id. at 131-32, 727 P.2d at 658-59. In
September 1983, Douglas Bratz also instituted an action against
Honda. Id. at 132, 727 P.2d at 659. In 1984, the trial judge ordered the two cases consolidated and ultimately granted Honda's
motion for a summary judgment. Id.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington, both plaintiffs contended that Honda was liable under the theories of strict
liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. Id. at 133, 727 P.2d at 659. Additionally the plaintiffs challenged the court's well established standard for "determining
when a product may be considered defective." Id.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court
focused on whether a manufacturer would be liable if children
were injured while operating minibikes "in violation of manufacturer and parental warnings." Id. at 132, 727 P.2d at 659. The
court affirmed the trial court's disposition of the case and held
that if a product is not defective and adequate warnings concern-
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ing its use are issued, the manufacturer is not liable for injuries
resulting from its products' use. Id. The court found that the
bike was designed solely for off-the-road use and that the accident resulted because the boys ignored manufacturer and parental warnings not to ride the bike on public streets. Id. Therefore,
the court concluded that Honda was not liable for the boys' injuries. Id. at 132-33, 727 P.2d at 659.
The Baughn court observed that most jurisdictions "require
that there be something wrong with the product before a riskutility analysis is permitted." Id. at 134-35, 727 P.2d at 660.
Baughn argued, however, that the court should adopt a risk utility standard similar to that adopted in NewJersey. Id. at 135, 727
P.2d at 660. Under this approach, the "plaintiff need not offer
preliminary proof that a product is defective." Id. If the jury
finds that the risks associated with the product's use outweighs its
utility, the risk-utility rule requires the product to be deemed defective. The Baughn court refused to adopt what it viewed as an
expansive standard. Id. at 136, 727 P.2d at 661. Instead, the
court chose to adhere to well established principles requiring a
consideration of consumer expectations in addition to the riskutility analysis in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous and therefore defective. If the court had adopted the
standard advanced by the plaintiff, the jury would be permitted
to decide whether the manufacturer of a well made and designed
product should be absolutely liable for all injuries resulting from
its product's use. According to the court, such an approach
would transform "strict liability into absolute liability." See id. at
135, 727 P.2d at 660. Thus, the court held that the manufacturer
could not be liable unless the product is deemed not to be reasonably safe. Id. at 135-36, 727 P.2d at 660-61.
The court's decision to adhere to its own firmly established
strict liability principles represents sound policy decision. To
hold otherwise would force manufacturers to pass the cost of additional insurance onto consumers. Thus, the ultimate cost of
many products would be excessively inflated. In addition, some
manufacturers may find it necessary to totally withdraw their
products from the market. The decision whether to impose liability on a manufacturer of a product that is not defective properly rests with the state legislature.
Michael F. Bodrato

